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Secular stagnation: The history of a
macroeconomic heresy
Roger E. Backhouse and Mauro Boianovsky
1. The re-discovery of secular stagnation
On 8 November 2013, at an IMF conference in honour of Stanley Fisher,
Lawrence Summers revived the doctrine of “secular stagnation”, an expres-
sion introduced by Alvin Hansen (1934, 1938, 1939). His reasons were that
massive financial expansion before the 20072008 crisis had not pro-
duced any signs of overheating in the real economy, and once the crisis
was resolved, there was no upturn in the economy. He suggested that this
experience was consistent with a negative Wicksellian natural rate of inter-
est, implying that full-employment saving exceeded investment at any non-
negative interest rate.
By 2013, the doctrine of secular stagnation had largely dropped out of
economic discourse. The timing of interest in secular stagnation is shown
by Figure 1, which plots the use of the term in JSTOR. It was used increas-
ingly frequently until 1950, after which its use declined (with a brief
upward blips around 1960 and in the 1970s). If accounts were taken of the
increased number of economics articles published, the decline would be
even more dramatic. The number of instances was tiny but the term never
disappeared.1
Hansen used the term to refer to a historical trend, rooted in American
experience. It was a thesis about the consequences of economic maturity,
his claim being that the closing of the frontier, a slowdown in the rate of
population growth, and a lack of new capital-using inventions had reduced
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the opportunities for the investment that was needed to sustain full
employment. Though his students  Evsey Domar, Everett Hagen, and
Paul Samuelson  used the term secular stagnation to refer to a theoreti-
cal possibility, the idea that economic maturity might be associated with
stagnation was taken up by Josef Steindl (1952) and Ingvar Svennilson
(1954). The empirical dimension of Hansen’s secular stagnation thesis
was critically examined by George Terborgh (1945), provoking a brief con-
troversy. During the 1950s, the notion that the United States was a mature
economy became well established, but by 1960 the association of maturity
with stagnation was lost. Economic maturity was now associated with pros-
perity: with the “affluent society” (Galbraith 1958) and “high mass con-
sumption” (Rostow 1960), in a sense a return to Mill’s classical notion of
full-employment stationary state that Hansen had criticised. Economists
might sometimes discuss secular stagnation but it was now firmly divorced
from the idea that it was a feature of a mature economy. It was only after
the end of the Cold War that this changed.
Figure 1 Economics articles using the phrase “Secular stagnation” in JSTOR,
19342011.
Source: dfr.jstor.org, search for “secular stagnation” in “Economics.” 29 April 2015.
The solid line is a five-year moving average.
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The idea that there may be limits to economic expansion has a long his-
tory. Adam Smith (1976, I.ix), unaware of the profound economic changes
that were to take place in Britain, wrote of countries achieving their “full
complement of riches”, with consequent low rates of interest. This per-
spective was shared by Malthus and Ricardo who saw the problem as a
shortage of fertile land. Though attitudes varied, the notion that growth
was eventually headed towards a stationary state on account of scarce natu-
ral resources was widely held (see Robbins 1930, pp. 196200). Karl Marx
held a different view of the constraints facing capitalist economies but
shared the classical vision of a downward tendency in the rate of profit,
which would put the system under increasing strain. Paul Sweezy (1942),
who interacted with Hansen at Harvard, elaborated the Marxian approach
to stagnation, combining it with some features of Hansen’s framework. At
the beginning of the twentieth century, J.A. Hobson, like (some versions
of) Marx, came close to the notion of secular stagnation in that he linked
under-consumption to the growth of machine production and maldistri-
bution of income. However, despite these important antecedents, picked
up by some writers, including Schumpeter (1942, Part II), Steindl and
Svennilson, it is Hansen’s work that marks the beginning of modern dis-
cussions (see also Penrose 1968), of which the latest episode is the one ini-
tiated by Summers (2013) and continued in the e-book edited by Teulings
and Baldwin (2014), a session at the American Economic Association
(AEA) (Eichengreen 2015, Gordon 2015, Summers 2015) and an article
in Foreign Affairs (Summers 2016).
The revival of interest in secular stagnation has prompted historical
studies of Hansen’s thesis and the controversies surrounding it (Dockes
2015, Hein 2015, O’Rourke 2016).2 Pierre Dockes (2015) has focused on
the controversy involving Terborgh and Hansen, and Sweezy and Schum-
peter. Kevin O’Rourke (2016) has looked at the development of Hansen’s
thesis in the context of the economic history of the time. Eckhard Hein
(2015) has called attention to Steindl’s (1952) heterodox approach, omit-
ted in the modern revival. In contrast, we focus on one specific tradition
in stagnation theory  Hansen’s introduction of the concept he called sec-
ular stagnation and its re-elaboration and transformation by his students
and colleagues and, more recently, by Summers.3 We shall see that
Summers’s characterisation of Hansen’s secular stagnation in terms of a
2 Before the recent surge of interest, Fogel (2005) discussed the issue from the
perspective of economic history. Rosenof (1997) is useful on the political con-
text for Hansen’s work.
3 In Backhouse and Boianovsky (2016), we discuss the relation between these the-
ories and theories based on inequality, such as those of Hobson and Piketty.
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negative (Wicksellian) natural rate of interest goes back in part to Law-
rence Klein (1947a), who in his turn was reacting to A.C. Pigou’s (1943)
interpretation of Hansen precisely on those terms. Although Wicksell’s
natural rate has become part of mainstream macroeconomics, Summers’s
idea of secular stagnation may be regarded (as Summers does) heretical,
since it is hard to justify a negative rate of interest in a Ramsey word.
2. Alvin Hansen and the origins of the stagnation thesis
Up to and including 1880 the country had a frontier of settlement, but at present the
unsettled area has been so broken into by isolated bodies of settlement that there
can hardly be said to be a frontier line. In the discussion of its extent, its westward
movement, etc., it can not, therefore, any longer have a place in the census reports.
(Superintendent of the Census for 1890, quoted in Turner 1921, p. 1)
According to the historian Frederick Jackson Turner, this short piece of
bureaucratic prose marked a historic moment in the American society. Up
to that point the history of the United States had been dominated by its
Westward expansion. “The existence of an area of free land”, Jackson wrote,
“its continuous recession, and the advance of American settlement western,
explain American development” (Turner 1921, p. 1). The thesis of the end
of the frontier became an important part of American public discourse.
Born in 1887 in rural South Dakota, Hansen came from the frontier that
according to Jackson was ending. He became a specialist in business cycle
theory. His early work, Cycles of Prosperity and Depression (1921) was empiri-
cal. Believing that Hobson had successfully rebutted the charge that
under-consumption was impossible, Hansen explained cycles of prosperity
and depression as the result of changes in money and credit. From the
beginning he sought a dynamic theory and made much use of the acceler-
ator, which showed that a slowing down of the growth of consumption
could lead to an absolute fall in investment.
During the 1920s, he began to see fluctuations in investment, driven by
population changes and waves of innovations, as the cause of the cycle.4
Monetary factors still played a role, but they merely served to magnify
other forces rather than being an independent factor. Hansen took from
Albert Aftalion the idea that the price level is determined by the level of
money income in relation to the quantity of goods and services being pro-
duced and from Arthur Spiethoff, the idea that there were certain invest-
ment opportunities available and once these were taken up, investment
would fall off, causing a downturn. The price system played a dynamic role,
4 This account of Hansen draws on Mehrling (1997, pp. 96101).
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assisting the movement of resources into sectors with greater investment
opportunities. A free enterprise system tended towards full employment
because price flexibility encouraged a healthy level of investment and a
high level of spending. However, despite this, the business cycle was an inev-
itable feature of a dynamic, growing economy with rapid technological
change. Only if the economy matured and accumulation slowed down
would the cycle become a thing of the past. These ideas conditioned
Hansen’s response to the Great Depression: it was particularly deep because
it was the result of large monetary and technological shocks happening
together.5 Recovery required innovation and technological advance that
would lower costs, raise profitability, and stimulate investment.
Hansen’s (1932, pp. 324) description of the stationary state, with no
population growth, as bliss was the same as J.S. Mill’s. However, although
he focused on monetary policy and adjustment to technological change
through the price mechanism, Hansen never abandoned the idea that the
flow of spending was important, talking of the “three faucets” though
which purchasing power entered the economy: business spending, con-
sumer spending, and government spending. It might sometimes be neces-
sary, he believed, for government to take responsibility for maintaining
the flow of purchasing power. In the late 1930s, Hansen added a further
element to his theory, now under the influence of J.M. Keynes (1936,
1937). The central point of his 1938 AEA Presidential Address, “Economic
progress and declining population growth”, was that population growth
was declining and that this would lead to a large fall in investment unless
there was a rise in technical progress (Hansen 1939, p. 10). The accelera-
tor was central to this argument, for what mattered was not the level of eco-
nomic activity but its growth rate. It would be possible to compensate for a
decline in private investment by increasing public investment “in human
and natural resources and in consumers’ capital goods of a collective char-
acter” (Hansen 1939, p. 12), but such compensation could be no more
than partial. If government spending were taken too far, it might alter the
cost structure so as to prevent the achievement of full employment.
This explanation fitted well into a long view of American economic his-
tory. The expansion of the frontier had sustained investment for a century.
After the closing of the frontier, demand for investment came from tech-
nological advance: motor vehicles and electricity stimulated the building
of a vast infrastructure, sustaining demand in the 1920s. The Great Crash
of 1929 may have originated in finance and the collapse of speculation,
but its consequences were severe because the stimulus from these indus-
tries was at an end. Declining population growth and the absence of new
5 See Mehrling (1997, pp. 10710).
Roger E. Backhouse and Mauro Boianovsky
950
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [U
niv
ers
ity
 of
 B
irm
ing
ha
m]
 at
 05
:46
 03
 N
ov
em
be
r 2
01
7 
industries meant a dearth of investment and a period of stagnation. The
immediate origins of the crisis might be short-term, but its severity was
the result of long-term structural factors (see also Lekachman 1966,
pp. 1317). Hansen took the idea of the New Frontier quite literally
(see Hansen and Perloff 1942, p. 7).
Hansen (1939, p. 4) defined the “essence of secular stagnation” as “sick
recoveries which die in their infancy and depressions which feed on them-
selves and leave a hard and seemingly immovable core of unemployment”.
He saw the concept as rooted in J.S. Mill’s notion of the stationary state,
suggesting that the term “mature economy” described Mill’s formulation
of the stationary state as a low-investment but high-consumption economy
(Hansen 1941, p. 310; see also Schumpeter 1954, p. 570). However, unlike
Mill’s stationary state, Hansen’s secular stagnation featured chronic unem-
ployment. Classical economists, he argued, may have been right about the
stationary state, but “they were wrong in assuming that the price system
could also ensure a propensity to consume compatible with this invest-
ment situation so as to produce full employment” (Hansen 1939).
Apart from the classical notion of the stationary state and its limitations,
Hansen’s idea of secular stagnation was influenced by Keynes’s article on
population growth in the Eugenics Review (1937) and by Hawtrey’s (1937)
distinction between “capital deepening” and “capital widening”. Although
he mentioned Keynes (1937) only briefly, in connection with the relative
historical stability of the capital–output ratio, Hansen (1939) may be seen
in part as elaborating Keynes’s theme.6 The perverse economic impact of
declining population growth attracted the attention of British economists
in the late 1930s, including Brian Reddaway and Roy Harrod, whose
dynamics (Harrod 1939) would catch Hansen’s attention only after
Harrod (1948). Hansen would later refrain from further reference to
Keynes (1937), which contained an incipient formulation of Harrod’s dis-
tinction between the natural and warranted growth rates. Hansen did not
associate Keynes with the stagnation thesis.7
Hansen (1939, 1946a) distinguished sharply between movements along
the marginal efficiency curve associated with changes of the rate of inter-
est, and upward shifts of the curve due to population growth and technical
progress, the latter being what mattered for avoiding secular stagnation.
Without population growth and innovation, a “constant level of the rate of
interest, no matter how low, would ultimately result in zero net
6 Hansen made notes on Keynes’s article. See Barber (1987, p. 203, n. 46) and
Mehrling (1997, pp. 1334).
7 This has been a controversial issue in history of thought. See Schumpeter (1954,
pp. 11723) and Guthrie and Tarascio (1992).
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investment”: “under-employment equilibrium” is not the result of an elas-
tic liquidity preference schedule but of limited investment opportunities
and an inelastic marginal efficiency schedule (Hansen 1946a, p. 185).
Hansen’s framework is clarified by comments he made on an unpub-
lished paper by Samuelson.8 The “real problem”, missed by Samuelson in
Hansen’s view, was the transition from a rapidly growing society in which
saving and investment are high to one in which saving and investment are
low. It was about the transition from one equilibrium position to another,
not a comparison of two equilibria. Hansen further criticised Samuelson
for assuming that investment depended on the level of consumption.
“Consumption,” he wrote, “determines only replacement capital and not
new capital. The real determinants of new investment are new products,
new ways of producing goods more economically, and growth.”
Hansen’s secular stagnation concept had nothing to do with the
notion  often ascribed to Keynes  that the problem is caused by the fact
that “rich people save proportionally more”, so that the marginal propen-
sity to consume is lower than the average propensity, with a declining ratio
of consumption demand to income as income grows.9 Hansen (1941,
pp. 2334; see also Samuelson 1943) argued that for both theoretical and
empirical reasons (referring to Kuznets 1941), the typical Keynesian con-
sumptionincome schedule did not hold for long-run secular changes in
real income, but only when large changes in income take place within a
relatively short period of time over the business cycle.
Theoretical criticism of Hansen’s ideas came in two contrasting forms.
Frank Knight (1936, 1944) completely rejected the concept of the
“stationary state”, on the grounds that there is no tendency to diminishing
returns to capital accumulation.10 The notion that the rate of return on
capital tends to zero was also rejected by Henry Simons (1942), but on the
somewhat distinct grounds that the demand for durable assets increases
rapidly at very low but positive interest rates, an argument he attributed to
Gustav Cassel (1903). A.C. Pigou (1943), on the other hand, accepted the
classical notion of the stationary state but rejected Hansen’s reformula-
tion, introducing, as a reaction to Hansen (1941), the hypothesis that the
saving function should include real money balances as an argument.11
According to Pigou, Hansen’s stationary state with unemployment fea-
tured a negative equilibrium full-employment rate of interest (Wicksell’s
8 Hansen to Samuelson, 27 February 1940 (Samuelson Papers, Duke University).
9 See, for example, Branson (1979. pp. 1856).
10 On Knight’s reasons, see Patinkin (1973 [1981]).
11 The idea is in Haberler (1941). Patinkin (1948, 1956) developed it as the “real
balance effect”.
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natural rate, although Pigou did not refer to Wicksell), whereas the market
money rate of interest could not fall below zero. As pointed out by Pigou,
under the classical assumption that saving is made only for the sake of the
income it is expected to yield in the future, in the long-run equilibrium of
the stationary state the rate of interest must be equal to the rate of dis-
count of the “representative man”. In order to account for a negative natu-
ral rate, Pigou assumed that savings are made also for other motives (such
as the “desire of possession as such”), which are inversely related to real
cash balances. Downward price flexibility, therefore, should be able to
bring about a shift of the full-employment saving function until it inter-
sected investment demand at a positive interest rate.
George Terborgh’s Bogey of Economic Maturity (1945) offered an empiri-
cal criticism of the secular stagnation thesis. Published by the Machinery
and Allied Products Institute, a federation of trade associations in the
industrial equipment sector, this book was well received by businessmen in
general, who regarded it as the antithesis of New Deal Economics. Ter-
borgh claimed that the decline in the rate of population growth and the
closing of the geographical frontier had taken already place by the end of
the nineteenth century, without causing depression. Moreover, a slowing
down of population growth changes the age structure and reduces saving
counteracting any fall in investment. He also challenged the view that an
increasing proportion of innovations were capital-saving (see Samuelson,
1948, pp. 4213). Hansen (1946b) rejected Terborgh’s empirical evi-
dence, and stressed that the main point of the stagnation thesis was not
that economic stagnation is unavoidable, but that proper economic policy
should be able to bring about a full employment growth path (see Rosenof
1997, Chapter 5, Dockes 2015, pp. 9779).
3. Keynesianism and secular stagnation
When Hansen (1936) critically reviewed Keynes’s General Theory he
described Keynes as offering a theory of “underemployment equilibrium”,
not of secular stagnation. A decade later, after he had come to see the use-
fulness of Keynes’s concept of the multiplier, Hansen (1946a, p. 184)
asserted that Keynes (1936) took for granted the “real factors” that deter-
mine the marginal efficiency of capital in a “dynamic society” and which
were central to his own theory.12 In Hansen’s view, Keynes (1936) focused
12 On Hansen’s “transformation” into a Keynesian economist in the late 1930s, see
Barber (1987) and Mehrling (1997). In his 1936 review, he wrote of “secular
unemployment” and of “stagnation”, but did not use the term “secular
stagnation”.
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on the “psychological” and “institutional” aspects of investment and the
rate of interest, while the “real” or “objective” factors  such as technical
progress and demographic dynamics  were “passed by almost
unnoticed”. It baffled Dudley Dillard (1955, p. 328) that Hansen’s Guide to
Keynes (1953) did not even discuss the relation of Keynes’s ideas to the
stagnation hypothesis, which is not mentioned in that book. Apparently,
Hansen found it difficult to express that hypothesis in terms of the static
IS-LM model, which he helped creating together with John Hicks (see also
Boianovsky 2004). However, though Hansen did not do so, others, includ-
ing several of Hansen’s students, were increasingly seeing secular stagna-
tion as a Keynesian idea.
Though memories of the depression were never far away, the context
for this reinterpretation of the idea of secular stagnation was fear that cuts
in military spending at the end of the Second World War would cause
depression. Samuelson and Hagen (1943) argued that a return to
“normalcy” was impossible. Though they cited Keynes’s Economic Conse-
quences of the Peace (1919), they followed Hansen’s analysis: depression
would become more common because saving was rising and new industries
were needed to drive investment. Though Hansen rapidly became more
optimistic, Samuelson remained cautious and in his textbook he devoted
several pages to secular stagnation (Samuelson 1948, pp. 41823). It was
not till the fourth edition (Samuelson 1958, p. 349) that it was reduced to
a short paragraph summarising Hansen’s theory followed by an even
shorter paragraph outlining the alternative case where population growth
and rapid innovation led to an excessive level of investment. “Secular
stagnation” and “secular exhilaration” had become two analytical possibili-
ties. In the 1960s, he used the idea to explain “A decade of sluggish growth
and rising unemployment” in which unemployment rate had been higher
at each successive cyclical peak (Samuelson 1961, p. 392). Secular stagna-
tion was, for Samuelson, part of an argument that, under some circumstan-
ces, the budget should not be balanced and disappeared only when
William Nordhaus became a co-author (1985).
Domar addressed the connection between stagnation and debt. If the
gap between private investment and saving had to be filled by government
spending, the result would be growing debt, on which interest would have
to be paid, raising the question of what would happen to the burden of
debt (Domar 1944). Domar showed that in a steadily growing economy
the public debt could grow indefinitely, as long as it grows no faster than
income. In “Capital expansion, rate of growth, and employment” (Domar
1946) he took account of productive capacity. Because investment was
linked to both the growth rate of productive capacity and the level of
income, Domar could show that there was an equilibrium rate of growth,
Roger E. Backhouse and Mauro Boianovsky
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at which income would grow at the same rate as productive capacity. Deriv-
ing his version of what is known as the HarrodDomar equation, he con-
cluded that equilibrium over time required growth at rate as, where s and
a are the potential social productivity of investment and the propensity to
save. Secular stagnation was what happened when investment grew more
slowly than this, causing an increase in unused capacity and unemploy-
ment. Though Domar acknowledged the importance of Keynes, he
attached more importance to Hobson  “Hobson’s writings contain so
many interesting ideas that it is a great pity he is not read more often”
(Domar 1947, p. 51)  and never abandoned his Hansenian roots, criticis-
ing Keynes for being too attached to “the desert of the stationary state”
and neglecting the dual character of investment (Domar 1957, p. 6, 14).
The heretical “problem of capital accumulation”  the inability of the
economy to absorb capital at a rapid rate  exists only if the possibilities
for capital-deepening are limited. As noted by Domar (1948), this was the
essence of the view, rejected by Knight and Simons, but shared by Marxists,
under-consumptionists and Keynesians. Such a view was based on the
assumption of a stable capitaloutput ratio, implied in Hansen but
explicit in other authors such as Sweezy and Harrod.13 In contrast, from
the perspective of the Knight–Simons position, investment opportunities
are unlimited, and the problem does not even exist (see also Boianovsky
2015).
Economists in Hansen’s circle tried to clarify what stagnation meant.
Alan Sweezy (1943, p. 69)14 argued that “stagnation” meant wasted produc-
tive capacity and unemployment caused by excess saving and did not imply
a cessation of technical progress, entrepreneurial initiative, or private
investment. The 1930s provided a striking example of “stagnation” accom-
panied by a “highly dynamic economic and social development”. Techno-
logical progress was rapid but not sufficient to generate a level of demand
that would keep capacity fully utilised. He considered the term “secular
stagnation” misleading in that it suggested a general loss of potential for
economic growth, which did not reflect Hansen’s meaning (Sweezy 1972,
p. 121). Claiming that Hansen’s stagnation thesis was largely an oral tradi-
tion, Higgins (1948, 1950, 1959, Chapter 7) sought repeatedly to formalise
13 Samuelson (1964, p. 743), in a new chapter on growth, ascribed to Hansen the
notion that the capital–output ratio is a technical constant and that any attempt
to accumulate capital beyond the rate required by the annual growth of output
will soon be unsuccessful due to excess capacity. Samuelson contrasted that
with Solow’s neoclassical growth model.
14 He was Paul Sweezy’s elder brother. Both had been at Harvard, with Hansen
and Samuelson, in the late 1930s.
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the concept as a theory of “increasing deflationary gap” or “increasing
unemployment” instead of “secular stagnation”.
In contrast, Lawrence Klein (1947a, pp. 845; 20613), in a PhD thesis
supervised by Samuelson, picked up the negative (Wicksellian) natural
interest rate from Pigou (1943) and turned it into a main feature of
Keynesian economics. The probability of a negative natural rate of interest
depended on the interest-inelasticity of both saving and investment func-
tions, which he considered empirically well established. The contrary view,
of investment as infinitely elastic, pertained to the world of Say’s law. He
defended the stagnation thesis against Pigou and traced it back to the
Marxian hypothesis of the declining rate of profit (Klein 1947b,
pp. 1279). It is worth noting that Samuelson would not use, in his discus-
sions of secular stagnation, Klein’s negative equilibrium interest rate
concept.
Writings such as these explain why, by the end of the 1950s, if not ear-
lier, the idea of secular stagnation had come to be associated with Keynes-
ian economics and the final chapter of the General Theory in which Keynes
speculated on the “euthanasia of the rentier”. Samuelson’s textbook was
seen as Keynesian. Gardner Ackley’s (1961, pp. 50912) widely used mac-
roeconomics textbook contained a section “Keynes and the stagnationists”
in which he criticised both Keynes and Hansen for overlooking the fact 
elaborated by Domar (1946)  that income growth can prevent capital sat-
uration. Domar’s theory came to be bracketed with Harrod’s Keynes-
inspired theory.
Harrod (1948, pp. vvi) stated that “sooner or later we [UK] shall be
faced once more with the problem of stagnation, and that it is to this prob-
lem that economists should devote their main attention”. That was
explained in Harrod’s model in terms of the relationship between the nat-
ural, warranted, and actual growth rates. If the warranted rate is above the
natural rate, the actual rate must be below the warranted rate for most of
the time, “and the centrifugal forces pull it further down, causing frequent
periods of unemployment”, which he described as a “dynamised version of
the stagnation thesis” (Harrod 1959, p. 455). Harrod’s concept of the
“natural rate of growth”  which is only implicit in Domar  as the sum of
the rate of growth of population and (neutral) technical progress caught
Hansen’s attention. Hansen (1951, pp. 47783) essentially subscribed to
Harrod’s model of unstable growth in a book that made only passing refer-
ence to secular stagnation. He saw Harrod’s approach to the determinants
of investment outlets as close to his own. Higgins (1950, p. 266) also
suggested that Harrod’s model was in many respects “an alternative
formulation of the Hansen thesis”. By the mid-1960s, even Hansen
claimed that “‘secular stagnation’ was another name for … Keynesian
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‘underemployment equilibrium’”, as both are based “fundamentally upon
the same foundational stones” represented by the difficulty in matching
savings and investment, as determined by the long-run behaviour of popu-
lation growth, technological progress, and discoveries of natural resources
(Hansen 1966, p. 7, Rosenof 1997, p. 51).
4. Alternative theories of stagnation
Hansen’s was not the only theory of stagnation. A similar notion could
be derived from the idea, widely used in the 1930s, that there were
50-year “Kondratiev” cycles in economic activity. A Kondratiev down-
turn might, till the upturn, be hard to distinguish from secular stagna-
tion. So too might the lulls between Schumpeterian waves of
innovation. But this was as much a description of the problem as an
explanation. Apart from the Marxian approach supported by Paul
Sweezy and Klein, Schumpeter and Steindl put forward distinct explan-
ations of the lack of dynamism of capitalism. Steindl, like Schumpeter,
was concerned with the potentially depressing consequences of the
shift of capitalism from competition to oligopoly. Whereas
Schumpeter’s Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy (1942) was widely
read, Steindl’s Maturity and Stagnation (1952) did not attract much
attention until the 1970s, and then mostly by heterodox economists.15
The timing of Steindl’s book did not help, as the American economy,
stimulated by spending on the Korean War, was experiencing a period
of economic growth. Whereas Steindl took Hansen (along with
Kalecki) as a starting point, Schumpeter (1942, 1943) rejected what he
called Hansen’s “theory of vanishing investment opportunity”. Instead,
Schumpeter (1943, p. 119) argued that the capitalist process itself pro-
duces “anti-capitalist policies”: a distribution of political power, an atti-
tude of the public mind, and an orientation of the political sector that
“are at variance with its own law of life.”
Instead of searching for causes “which are in themselves puzzling and
mysterious problems, like the development of technology and the trend of
population”, Steindl (1952, p. 192; see also pp. 1689, for references to
Hansen) looked at the growth of oligopoly as the explanation of the appar-
ent decline in the rate of growth of the American economy since the end
of the nineteenth century. According to his microeconomic model, this
15 An exception to this neglect was Hansen (1954). On Steindl, see Lee (1999),
Dutt (2005), and Hein (2015). On Schumpeter, see Boianovsky and Trautwein
(2010, pp. 24951).
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should be accompanied by increase in profit margins and fall in effective
demand in relation to capacity.
Hansen (1954) wrote a largely positive review of Steindl (1952). He
identified three types of stagnation theory: (i) theories based mainly on
exogenous factors (technological progress, population, and new territo-
ries), represented by Hansen’s own analysis and “perhaps also that of
Harrod”; (ii) theories based on changes in social institutions (increasing
state intervention, growth of the labour movement, non-competitive struc-
tures) and their impact on the “arterial sclerosis” of capitalism, as repre-
sented by Schumpeter (1942); and (iii) theories based on endogenous
microeconomic factors such as the development of imperfect competition
and oligopoly and their impact on income distribution and excess capac-
ity, as represented by Steindl.16 This explained why Hansen looked to fiscal
policy for the solution whereas Schumpeter and Steindl looked to changes
in the price system.
5. Macroeconomic theory
In Hansen’s (1954, p. 412) view, post-war prosperity did not disprove
the stagnation thesis: “How inventive, productive and dynamic the
American private enterprise can be when operating under the pull of
adequate aggregate demand”, he wrote, “has been demonstrated in a
remarkable laboratory experiment during the last fifteen years” (the
Second World War). However, he warned, there were “sound reasons
for the proposition that the economy cannot on its own generate
enough steam to provide its full potential growth”. Unaided by the
“massive fiscal powers of the federal government”, the American econ-
omy should not be able to reach its full-employment growth path.
Hansen deployed the term “laboratory experiment” in his review of a
book by William Fellner (1956), a Keynesian economist critical of the
secular stagnation thesis. Hansen disputed Fellner’s claim that exoge-
nous technical progress was the main element behind the long period
of sustained growth since the end of the war. Such growth could not
have happened, argued Hansen, without expansionary fiscal policy.
Moreover, technological progress was probably stimulated by adequate
aggregate demand, meaning that the actual and potential growth
trends are not independent from one another. “It requires”, charged
16 European stagnation was the subject of Svennilson (1954) (see Boianovsky
2012). As Hansen (1957b, pp. 67) pointed out with evident satisfaction, Sven-
nilson took into account the negative impact on economic activity of the declin-
ing European population growth rate.
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Hansen, a “pretty heavy black-out of a vast laboratory experiment to
believe that this vastly enlarged role of government has really played
no role in the spectacular transition from stagnation to sustained
growth and expansion” (1957a, p. 114).
However, whatever Hansen thought, by the late 1950s, idea that the US
economy was doomed to secular stagnation had fallen out of favour. It was
dismissed as the result of the tendency of some economists to treat any
problem that had lasted for more than a short period as being permanent.
In the 1930s, that problem had been stagnation, in the 1950s it was the dol-
lar shortage and inflation, and in other periods it would be something
else. In the 1950s and 1960s, discussions of secular stagnation were most
often found in economic history, history of economic thought, and devel-
opment economics, the field in which Higgins increasingly specialised. It
was also used in Samuelson’s textbook to describe the problem of stagna-
tion over several business cycles, to which the “New economics” of the Ken-
nedy administration was the response. For economists such as Samuelson,
who assumed the existence of oligopoly, there was no theoretical problem
in maintaining such a position. However, for economists who thought in
terms of perfectly competitive markets, or who believed that free enter-
prise must generate an optimal outcome, the situation was different. And
Lekachman (1964, p. 5) suggested that secular stagnation could be a con-
venient label for “any persistent tendency” of aggregate demand and sup-
ply to approach equilibrium at less than full employment. He considered
Hansen’s notion of secular stagnation to be “the only truly original Ameri-
can extension of Keynesian economics until at least the 1950s” (1966,
p. 131).
Harry Johnson (1971, p. 6) pointed out the role played by the stagna-
tion thesis in turning Keynesian economics into the new orthodoxy in the
post-war period. He argued that the view that unemployment is always the
foremost social problem was elevated into a “dogma” in the USA under
the leadership of Hansen, whose theory of secular stagnation “has been
quietly forgotten, or frugally converted into a theory applicable to under-
developed countries”, although vestiges of it still lingered in American
Keynesianism at the time. Johnson was thus positive about Leijonhufvud’s
(1968) attempt to distinguish between Keynesian economics and the eco-
nomics of Keynes. For Leijonhufvud, “Keynesian economics”, as repre-
sented by the HicksHansen IS-LM diagram and Hansen’s stagnation
thesis, was not the “economics of Keynes”, which should be understood in
terms of disequilibrium (see Backhouse and Boianovsky 2013). Patinkin
(1956, Chapter 14), another of the major figures in disequilibrium macro-
economics, contained a section on “secular growth versus secular
stagnation” as part of his analysis of Keynesian and classical theories of
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unemployment. However, the real balance effect meant that stagnation,
though it might last a long time, could not be permanent.
Leijonhufvud (1968, p. 316), too, pointed out the original secular con-
text of the Pigou effect, which should be seen against the background of
post-war “Stagnationist Keynesianism” and its insistence that it proved the
possibility of “unemployment equilibrium”. Leijonhufvud (1968, pp.
15961) interpreted the stagnationist school as denying the proper work-
ing of the price mechanism, due to inelastic functions, which he con-
trasted with Keynes. Like Patinkin before him, Leijonhufvud deemed a
purely static interpretation of unemployment equilibrium incompatible
with Keynes, and argued for a dynamic disequilibrium interpretation. He
acknowledged Patinkin’s priority, but claimed that his point for a dynamic
interpretation was made in “stronger and more general terms” than Pati-
nkin’s, for Patinkin (as Klein before him) had laid great weight on the
interest-inelasticity of investment as a factor influencing the time length of
disequilibrium while the real balance effect operates. As noted by Leijon-
hufvud (p. 176), the stagnationist point about a negative natural rate of
interest was based on the lack of outlets for saving. Leijonhufvud rejected
that notion by referring to Martin Bailey’s (1962, pp. 10714, 12330)
and Cassel’s (1903, pp. 10609) argument  subscribed to by Simons, as
discussed above  that the demand for fixed durable capital goods
becomes very elastic at low interest rates. As observed by Leijonhufvud (p.
189, n. 2), Keynes’s position about the possibility of capital saturation was
quite distinct from Cassel’s or Bailey’s. At the same time, Leijonhufvud
(pp. 41011) denied that Keynes was a stagnationist in Hansen’s sense.
Throughout the 1970s and early 1980s, as macroeconomic performance
deteriorated in the USA and Europe, the notion of “stagflation” caused by
aggregate supply shocks came to the fore. However, this was not secular
stagnation, which was absent from most of the mainstream macroeco-
nomic literature. Secular stagnation attracted some attention from hetero-
dox economists who had already discussed it in the past, such as Paul
Sweezy (1982) and Steindl (1979) (see Rosenof 1997, Chapter 13). Steindl
(1987) wrote the entry on “stagnation” in the New Palgrave, which mainly
restated his 1952 interpretation and surveyed classic contributions by Han-
sen and Marxian authors. It also caught the attention of the economic
journalist Leonard Silk (1976) and, in the 1970s and 1980s, demographers
occasionally referred to secular stagnation in the context of declining pop-
ulation growth in developed countries, but tended to dismiss its practical
relevance (see e.g. Neal, 1978, Espenshade 1978).
Secular stagnation, therefore, became primarily a topic in the history of
economic thought, especially after Hansen’s death in 1975. Samuelson
(1976, 1988, 2002) discussed Hansen’s stagnation thesis, calling attention
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to the fact that Hansen (correctly) did not anticipate stagnation in the post-
war period.17 Samuelson (1988)  written for the centenary of Hansen’s
birthday  was the first formalisation of Hansen’s secular stagnation thesis
since Higgins (1950).
6. Changing conceptions of a mature economy
In the 1930s, the idea of a mature economy had been associated with the
demographic transition and the exhaustion of investment opportunities,
making it easy for Hansen to associate it with stagnation. However, by the
1960s, though the United States was still seen as a mature economy, that
notion came to be conceived very differently. The development of the
national accounts meant that the United States could be contrasted much
more clearly with Europe and the “under-developed world”: the gap
between the US per capita income and that of the rest of the world had
increased enormously. “Modernization theory”, which pervaded not only
development economics but other social sciences, such as political science
and international relations (see Gilman 2003), saw the United States as
the economy towards which other countries were moving. It was, in
Galbraith’s words, the archetypal Affluent Society (1958).
This conception of the United States as a mature, modern economy was
shown most clearly in its political context in Walt Rostow’s The Stages of Eco-
nomic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto (1960). Countries passed through
historical stages, such as the “take-off into self-sustained growth”, Rostow’s
characterisation of the British Industrial Revolution, a stage through
which other developed countries had passed, and culminated in the “age
of high mass consumption”, represented by the contemporary United
States. Alexander Gerschenkron questioned the idea that countries had to
go through preordained stages, but the idea of “backwardness”, with its
implication of a hierarchy, was still there. In the growth accounting of
Angus Madison, “catch up”  growth that arose from the adoption of tech-
nologies already in use in more advanced countries  was one of the many
contributions to economic growth, by definition not available to the most
advanced country. But this was hardly a context that left room for a mature
economy to stagnate. Worse, if it did, it would raise fundamental questions
about the superiority of the free-market system over its Soviet counterpart.
Government spending might be necessary to maintain full employment
17 Samuelson probably had in mind Hansen’s (1943, pp. 18, 21) expectation that
the “potentialities for expansion of consumption and private investment in the
immediate postwar period are sufficient to indicate the possibility of a genuine
and fairly prolonged postwar boom”.
Secular stagnation: The history of a macroeconomic heresy
961
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [U
niv
ers
ity
 of
 B
irm
ing
ha
m]
 at
 05
:46
 03
 N
ov
em
be
r 2
01
7 
but in the Cold War it was natural for the government to play a larger role
in the economy than in the 1930s. Consensus on this point had not yet bro-
ken down.
Rostow (1956, p. 27) did not exclude the “possibility of growth giving
way to secular stagnation or decline in the long term”. He asked, “Will
man fall into secular spiritual stagnation, finding no worthy outlet for the
expression of his energies, talents, and instinct to reach for immortality?”
(1960, p. 91). That was a speculative question but once the Cold War was
over, Rostow (1998, p. 131, 2000, p. 393) discussed the problem of stagna-
tion linking it to slow population growth. After rapid growth from 1950 to
1980, Japan had entered into a period of stagnation that he analysed in
Hansenian terms. Japan was just the first case, because “all nations will
have to settle down to a stagnant population, at best, if they are to survive”.
Rostow’s sense of a “mature economy” had changed with the ending of
the Cold War.
7. Secular stagnation, now and then
The heretical character of the secular stagnation hypothesis is reflected in
Summers’s reference, at his 2013 IMF speech in honour of Stanley Fischer,
to “a set of older and much more radical ideas that I have to say were pretty
much rejected in [Fischer’s 1970s MIT class on monetary economics], a set
of older ideas that went under the phrase secular stagnation.” Summers
contrasted secular stagnation with theories that take the average level of
output and employment over a long time period as given. Mainstream
macroeconomics is about fluctuations of employment and output around
their equilibrium levels, and the goal of macroeconomic policy is to
reduce volatility. The “new secular stagnation hypothesis”, on the other
hand, as claimed by Summers (2014a, p. 29), argued that fluctuations in
activity are small in relation to the trend and that, as shown by Japanese
experience since the 1990s and the poor performance of the United States
and Europe after the 20072008, market forces are insufficient to bring
the economy to its full-employment growth path due to a permanently
negative natural rate of interest.18 Moreover, Summers (2016) suggests, in
the secular stagnation scenario, exceptionally high growth rates  as in
the USA during 20032007  often come from dangerous borrowing that
turn excess saving into unmaintainable investment levels, as illustrated by
18 von Weizs€acker (2014), circulated in draft in 2011, put forward a capital-theo-
retic B€ohm–Bawerkian/Wicksellian model featuring a negative natural rate of
interest. However, this model does not include unemployment or stagnation.
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the housing bubble. Saving tends to flow into existing assets, causing asset
price inflation.
The return of the secular stagnation thesis has been preceded by the
revival of the concept of the liquidity trap under the guise of the “zero
lower bound” to nominal interest rates (see Boianovsky 2004). Secular
stagnation means that the zero lower bound becomes a permanent prob-
lem (Krugman 2014). This creates problems for modelling. In the Ram-
sey–CassKoopmans representative agent framework, the steady-state real
interest rate cannot fall below the rate of discount, which has to be positive
if the model is not to explode. An alternative is to build an overlapping
generations model along the lines of Samuelson (1958), with heteroge-
neous agents. This has been done by Eggertsson and Mehrotra (2014), the
first attempt to formalise Summers’s “new secular stagnation
hypothesis”.19
As observed by Bernanke (2015), the secular stagnation hypothesis is
about inadequate aggregate demand, not aggregate supply.20 In contrast,
Gordon (2014, 2015) has focused on the “supply side” of secular stagna-
tion: the effects on the potential growth trend. According to Gordon
(2014, p. 48), because Hansen wrote before the invention of the concept
of potential output and its measurement, he and his colleagues lacked a
notion of aggregate productivity or its growth rate, implying that the 1930s
and 1940s stagnationists were not aware of the fact that average aggregate
productivity was rising in the late 1930s (productivity increased by 3.8%
per annum in the USA in 19371940, as compared to 0.8% in
20092014). However, as discussed above, Higgins (1950) and other stag-
nationists stressed that the key indicator was the deflationary gap between
potential and actual output. The absence of numbers for productivity
growth in the 1930s had not prevented Alan Sweezy (1943) from pointing
out that secular stagnation was not about lack of technical progress, which
was proceeding at a rapid rate.
Summers (2014b, 2015, 2016) points to factors behind the apparently
negative natural rate of interest: the reducing capital intensity of some key
industries (particularly in sectors involving information technology),
declining population growth, increasing saving due to higher income and
wealth inequality, and falling relative prices of capital goods. He refers to
Hansen only in connection with the demographic factor. However,
19 Pigou avoided this problem by postulating that saving decision are affected by
factors beside the expected yield from capital accumulation. The Pigou effect is
conspicuously absent from recent discussions of secular stagnation. See Boia-
novsky (2004, p. 116).
20 Bernanke, however, rejects secular stagnation, partly for reasons that are remi-
niscent of the Knight–Simons arguments.
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Hansen did discuss the perverse effect of capital-saving innovations on
investment demand and the capital–output ratio, and the increase of
savings coming from corporations (see Higgins 1948). Like many
others, Summers believes Hansen’s stagnation thesis was proved wrong
by the post-war boom, until changing economic and demographic cir-
cumstances led to its restatement. The revival of the secular stagnation
thesis, as argued by Summers (2016), means that fiscal policy may
regain the central role it played in aggregate demand management dur-
ing Hansen’s time. In particular, expansionary fiscal policy may reduce
excess saving and push the natural interest rate upwards. This is distinct
from the new orthodoxy established in the 1980s, which looked at price
level stability as the overall policy goal and to monetary policy as the
key to demand management.
It is generally assumed that the secular stagnation hypothesis disap-
peared because it was obviously refuted by events. However, events could
not refute the claim that secular stagnation was possible. Changing atti-
tudes towards secular stagnation have always had an important political
dimension. Though Hansen had used the term earlier, the idea took off
only in 1938. The reason was not that the US had experienced nine years
of depression: the shock was that recovery suddenly aborted in 1937, with
a downturn even more severe than that of 1929. By this point, the New
Deal was widely seen as taking a turn that was critical of business, and busi-
ness opposition to it was growing (see Phillips-Fein 2010). In 1938,
responding to a request from Roosevelt, a joint resolution of the Congress
established a Temporary National Economic Committee, to investigate
the problem of excessive concentration of economic power, believed to lie
at the root of America’s problems. This was the context in which Hansen
and Currie persuaded policy-makers to take seriously the idea that the
problem might lie in the coordination of saving and investment, an idea
closely linked to secular stagnation (see Backhouse 2015). Secular stagna-
tion was thus highly political from the start.
Herbert Stein (1969, pp. 1756), writing an insider’s history of
America’s “fiscal revolution”, put the politics in a more subtle way. Policy-
makers did not like the claim that historical changes had reduced the pro-
pensity to invest because to view investment as “a passive response to histor-
ical factors … seemed to deny the dynamic role of the businessmen, in
which they took pride and which ‘legitimized’ their incomes and position
in society.” Neither could they accept the never-ending growth of the fed-
eral debt to which the thesis seemed to point. They could accept fiscal pol-
icy only as a remedy for fluctuations, not to solve the problem of
stagnation. Stein claimed that the fading of secular stagnation was “partly”
the result of economic arguments.
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The implications of post-war experience for secular stagnation
depended critically on how the idea was interpreted. The historical thesis
centred on Turner’s (1921) argument about the ending of the frontier
might seem an argument from a different era. It no longer made sense to
see secular stagnation as a problem of economic maturity  now seen as
involving high mass consumption and rapid technological development,
for it seemed to be a problem afflicting “immature economies” in the
underdeveloped world. Yet as long as Keynesian theory was thought to
show that economies would not necessarily achieve full employment, the
idea that fiscal stimulus might be needed to maintain aggregate demand
remained a possibility. Post-war reconstruction, the Korean War, the Cold
War, and the massively increased role for government might raise demand
sufficiently that there was no need to make a case for expansion until the
early 1970s, but it did not mean that secular stagnation was disproved. It
remained possible that stagnation would re-emerge should the role of gov-
ernment be reduced.
The decisive reason for mainstream economists’ rejection of secular
stagnation was the acceptance, by the 1970s, of the rational-agent gen-
eral competitive equilibrium model based on inter-temporal optimisa-
tion as the dominant framework in macroeconomics, finally displacing
the presumption, rooted in the institutionalist literature of the 1930s
but still found in Samuelson’s textbook, that markets were oligopolistic.
When this happened, it became very difficult to make a case that secular
stagnation was theoretically coherent. Arguments from economic theory
and ideology came together to push the concept out of contemporary
economics. As the theory of secular stagnation  the branch of stagna-
tion theory running from Hansen to Samuelson  changed, so too did
the mixture of theoretical, empirical, and political reasons for consider-
ing it heretical.
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Abstract
The paper presents a history of the concept of “secular stagnation”, from
Alvin Hansen in the 1930s and 1940s to its recent revival by Larry
Summers. We examine Hansen’s ideas and those of young economists
associated with him, notably Evsey Domar, Everett Hagen, Benjamin
Higgins, Alan Sweezy, and Paul Samuelson, who were the economists who
kept the doctrine alive in the 1950s and to whom Summers and others
taking up the idea recently turned. Their ideas are contrasted with the
theories of stagnation associated with Josef Steindl and Joseph
Schumpeter. It is a label for a historical thesis about the American
economy, which, initially seen as distinct from Keynes General Theory, came
to be seen as a theoretical proposition based on Keynesian theory. It is
argued that the idea of secular stagnation had a political dimension,
connected to the New Deal and the Cold War and changing conceptions
of economic maturity.
Keywords
Secular stagnation, economic maturity, unemployment equilibrium, nega-
tive natural rate of interest, population growth
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